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PAY PRODUCTIVITY AND PUBLIC SERVICES
I
A PRESENT OF TRENDS AND TRIBULATIONS
This paper is a follow-up to the 1995 Adedeji Report (Adedeji-Green-Janha) o f the same title 
for UNDP and UNICEF. The bulk o f that report both as to data and analysis remains relevant 
and is background for this brief summary o f situation, hypotheses, proposals and selected 1995
- 97 events. If  the analysis and directions o f proposals appear sound it is a guidepost to 
further (or updated) country case studies and one or more pilot efforts to support (and/or 
catalyse) action along the proposed lines.
From the twilight o f colonial rule in the 1940s and 1950s and - especially - from the dawn o f  
national rule in the 1960s (or later in Southern Africa), most SSA countries rapidly expanded 
access to basic services and - to a lesser degree - to second and third tier elements (e.g. 
secondary schools, universities, provincial and reference hospitals and medical/educational 
professional training institutions). This rapid expansion tapered off - from the mid 1960s in a 
few cases e.g. Ghana, Zaire, more frequently in the early 1970s and generally in the 1980s. In 
fact, the 1980s saw overall falls in quantitative access and in quality in a majority o f countries 
only very partially clawed back in the 1990s.
A parallel evolution characterised policy analysis, advising (to politicians) and implementation. 
The decline in quality has been very uneven - in some cases the late colonial/early 
independence upward trend in capacity, while slowed, may in an absolute sense have 
continued. However, the demands o f the 1970s - after what in retrospect were 1960s global 
economic and environmental conditions much more favourable than before 1950 or since 1972
- and especially o f the 1980s and 1990s have grown even more rapidly so that the overload 
has risen and in some cases brought even systems of substantial absolute professional policy 
competence to the verge o f collapse.
Over 1969 - 1995 there appears to have been a 40% per capita fall in public service 
provision. The absolute levels have been stagnant while population has risen between 2.5%
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and 3% a year. The average does conceal substantial country and urban/rural scatter. 
Imploded and other violence torn states and especially their rural residents have fared worst 
while in a few cases, e.g. Botswana, Mauritius, trend advances have continued and in others,
e.g. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland, recovery has been rapid since about 1992 but from 
abysmally low (and fallen) bases. However, the general theme o f sustained decline in both per 
capita availability and quality in the 1980s and, at best, stagnation over the past few years 
applies to a majority o f SSA countries.
Public service real pay - very unequal absolutely and relative to the cost o f living in the 
period to 1979 - has shrunken sharply. Abstracting from South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius 
and the Seychelles the fall is over 50% and in many countries leaves core basic service 
professional pay below 50% of the household absolute poverty line - unambiguously true 
o f  Rwanda, Mozambique, Tanzania and, more narrowly, Mali o f the Adedeji Report’s five 
case studies. This decline has paralleled radical declines in productivity and - less uniformly - 
professionalism. It has also paralleled sharp trend rises in technical assistance injection and 
foreign NGO insertion after largely to replace in part citizen public servants driven out or 
rendered less productive by sub-subsistence pay.
Attempts to reverse the decline have been aborted or limited by revenue constraints. The most 
notable successes - Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland - are all postwar revenue recovery, defence 
bill decline cases and all are now up against revenue constraints. SSA tax and related revenues 
as a proportion o f GDP have stagnated since 1979. Since per capita GDP has declined the per 
capita domestic financed resource availability has declined. The same holds for real per capita 
external transfers (aid, etc). In the aid case, emergency and technical assistance proportions 
have risen still further cutting generally useable funding per capita. On the expenditure side 
the proportion o f debt service, emergency relief and - in some cases - defence have risen 
increasing the squeeze on basic services in general and salaries in particular.
African (non uniformed) public services are on average low in respect to global averages
even for low and lower middle income countries. They are even lower relative to the levels 
needed to provide universal access to primary and continuing education, basic health 
services, peace and security (law and order), extension services, water and 
operation/m aintenance of other basic infrastructure. These categories - primary teachers, 
nurses and medical aides, water technicians, agricultural extension field officers, constables
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and magistrates, works artisans foreman - semi skilled workers comprise 50% to 70% o f 
public servants in most SSA countries. In Mali to  provide universal primary education at 45 
pupils per class would require more than quadrupling the teaching service and, by itself - 
require an increase o f at least 75% in total public service numbers. In general levels o f public 
service employment have been static recurrent, fluctuating or declining, for over a decade and 
a half (oscillating around a declining trend since 1973/74 in the case o f Tanzania).
The proportion o f pay to recurrent budget spending in health - education - w ater - police - 
agriculture varies but seems to cluster around 25% - 30%. However, at field unit level - e.g. 
rural primary schools it is often much higher.
II
YOU D O N’T GET WHAT YOU W O N’T PAY FOR: SOME HYPOTHESES
The public services provision decline stretched above arguably guarantees no sustainable 
recovery in SSA. Without rising levels o f literacy, health and nutrition it is very hard to see 
(whether heuristically or empirically) how SSA can become more competitive or more 
productive. Now, in the absence o f such rises, can enabling contexts for household 
productions out o f absolute poverty approaches have good prospects beyond very low 
ceilings.
The issue o f sub-subsistence pay for the majority o f Africa’s public servants does not turn 
primarily on their household poverty. They constitute perhaps 5% to 10% o f absolutely rural 
households which is not insignificant but not central. The basic damage is to public service 
provision without which there is no evident way the majority o f absolutely poor 
households can be enabled to produce their way out of absolute poverty .
A series o f hypotheses can be constructed from general analysis and consensus on 
development and from the SSA empirical record. These are borne out by the same case 
studies o f  the Adedeji Report.
1. SSA is falling further behind other poor and lower middle income countries in life 
expectancy, under 5 mortality, nutrition, average levels of education, and other ‘human
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infrastructure’ indices. This is a result in the absolute fall o f  basic public services per 
capita and o f deterioration in their quality. The implications for sustainable recovery - let 
alone development are grim. Development and growth appear increasingly to  depend on 
human productivity which in turn depends on health, education and nutrition. I f  SSA 
continues to fall back - even relatively let alone absolutely - it will become less and less 
competitive, less and less attractive to investors and more and more dependent on 
emergency relief in crisis (and even ‘non-crisis’) years.
2. Basic public services include:
a. primary and adult education;
b. primary health services;
c. accessible pure water (for household and livestock uses as well as drinking);
d. peace - i.e. ability to go about daily life without ever-present fear o f  violent 
intervention by anyone (bandits, rich engrossers, government authorities) basically 
provided by user friendly constables and magistrates within a rule o f law;
e. extension (especially but not only agricultural);
f. speculation and maintenance o f other ground level infrastructure - e.g. roads, 
telephones, posts, sewerage and drainage;
g. tax collection (to finance the other services).
For these the only acceptable target is universal access with as rapid phased progress as 
practicable. They need to be backed up by secondary and tertiary services as well as being 
o f acceptable quality and cost accessible to poor majorities and to the 20% to 60% 
absolutely poor large minorities through pluralities to majorities.
3. To provide these basic services would require significant increases in public service 
base level professional and paraprofessionals from perhaps 30% in Tanzania to at least 
200% in Ethiopia and Mali and at least 100% in Mozambique.
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4. While perhaps 10%  of public service posts in most SSA countries are not priority,
most o f these are at the bottom of pay scales so, only 2% - 3% o f salary bill savings looks 
likely. (Exceptions exist - e.g. Sudan, Congo - ex Zaire).
5. Another much larger proportion - perhaps 25% on average - of public servants are 
very inadequately qualified and urgently need refresher and upgrading training.
Some may be untenable and need to be replaced. Such a process o f training, selective 
retirement and recruitment is - self evidently - not cost reducing.
6. Public service pay has deteriorated to the extent that official payments (even 
including afterwards) leave over half below the household poverty line and in many 
countries for a majority they are below the absolute poverty line for a household o f
six (varying from perhaps $60 per month in Ethiopia, $80 in Tanzania and Mozambique, 
$100 plus in Rwanda, $120 - 150 in Mali). Indeed perhaps a quarter o f Africa’s public 
servants are now paid $20 - 30 a month including higher proportions o f primary school 
teachers, nurses, water technicians, constables, extension workers.
7. To survive on these wages public servants and their households must cope:
a. use public service time and materials to earn second incomes (non attendance at - or to  
- work and pilferage e.g. o f vehicle spares or medical supplies);
b. collect unauthorised user fees (e.g. for access to offices, for bedpans, for putting 
stamps on letter and posting effectively, cut price vehicle condition and traffic fares);
c. engage in more straightforward bribe taking and related corruption e.g. tax officials 
sharing the legally required tax take with a portion to the state, a portion to the tax 
officer and a portion to the non-payer.
d. increasing the number o f other economically active members o f the household.
8. Except for ‘d’ all are destructive of professionalism, productivity and/or the access to 
public services of poor people. At the base professional/para professional level this is the 
‘corruption’ o f  need not the corruption of greed. This does not alter its indestructibility 
but does alter the normative reality (states that fail to pay leading their employees into
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temptation can expect not to get the professionalism, productivity and honesty they have 
so singularly failed to pay for) and the plausible ways to overcome the ‘corruption’.
9. Because o f coping most SSA public sector pay scales are below efficiency minimum
i.e. higher pay could increase output per unit of salary. This is evident in most o f the 
Adedeji Report countries where comparable private enterprise sector pay is 3 to 8 times 
public service. (Teachers and nurses do not have directly comparable opportunities, but 
often are paid under half private sector unskilled or semi skilled rates.)
10. Restoration - or a trend toward restoration with an immediate target of two thirds 
household absolute poverty level as a minimum with, say, 10 times as much for the 
most senior 1% to 2% of public servants - is a necessary condition to ‘buy out’/end 
the need for coping and to create an environment in which professionalism and 
productivity can be restored. It is not a sufficient condition - professional standards and 
procedures training and compulsory attendance at and to work need to be introduced in 
parallel. (They cannot be introduced first because many - perhaps most - public servants 
cannot afford to stop coping unless paid more).
11. There is no realistic option of privatising the basic services listed. They are not 
profitable if operated on a broad tending to universal access basis. They fall within what 
almost all analysts (including the World Bank) would define as the core roles of enabling 
governance.
12. Domestic social sector groups (churches, mosques, womens’ groups, co-ops, trade 
unions, community associations) can play a useful role in their provisions. The Christian 
medical services/government medical services coordination and cooperation in e.g. Ghana, 
Tanzania and Namibia, which Mozambique is now trying to emulate demonstrate this. 
They also demonstrate the need for state participation in financing e.g. wages o f domestic 
personnel state, drugs and imported medical supplies as well as the capital projects donors, 
food and maintenance by users and social sector sponsors.
13. Technical assistance - as now operated - is part of the problem more than of the 
solution. It cuts up an increasing share o f  transfers to SSA (up to 40% in bilateral flows). 
It often exceeds domestic public service wage and salary bill - by up to 3 to 1 in Tanzania
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and 7 to 1 in Ethiopia. Up to half merely replace (at an average all in cost o f  over 
$100,000 a year) citizen professionals driven out by low pay (who would stay or return at 
$6,000 to $7,000) which is a very poor bargain now and corrosive o f  national capacity. 
Another quarter are largely unuseable because they prepare advice (often duplicating that 
o f citizen personnel) which lacks o f  resources (middle level personnel, complementary 
goods e.g. textbooks, pump spares, and base level personnel attendance and morale) 
render quite unimplementable. The last quarter are often very valuable - genuinely filling 
gaps and complementing citizen expertise in a capacity building way. However, in some 
SSA countries there is a growing (if often concealed) backlash against all ta up to viewing 
it as a northern open air relief scheme for otherwise unemployable professionals which 
compromises the effectiveness o f the key 25%;
14. Massive insertion of external NGOs to run competitive or replacement basic services 
is even more downward spiral creative. They substitute for (and are frequently blatantly 
hostile to) domestic social sector service providers. They refuse to coordinate with 
government and domestic social sector providers so rendering coherent strategies, 
institution building and division o f labour impractical. Further - because o f  their lavish use 
o f expatriates and fragmentation o f services - they are cost inefficient. In M ozambique - 
using UNDP and Budget data - NGO’s spend twice as much on health services as the 
Ministry o f  Health and provide a fifth as many services. No serious claim is made that 
their services are o f substantially higher quality. An even worse backlash is building up in 
some countries not least among domestic social sector actors;
15. Cost sharing with users (sometimes rather deceptively marketed as “participation”) has 
real but limited potential. Probably 15% to 20% o f primary education and health costs 
could be covered albeit 25% to 100% o f primary water (where new public alternative have 
high cash costs in cities and high labour opportunity costs in rural areas). Even at that 
level problems o f workable exemption provisions to allow universal access arise. Further 
point o f  use fees for services which provide future income (education) or in which expense 
is at the time income is lowest (health) have serious economic objections. Basic service 
unit contracts with user communities to provide (through their own structures) packages 
o f labour, food, materials, furniture and cash o f - say - 15% o f health and education and
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25% to 50% o f water costs might be more promising as to revenue and efficient in access, 
and more narrowly economic, terms;
16. External soft finance is in fact (even if less generally on its face) not useable to pay 
minimum efficiency level wages and salaries. This is not economically efficient in cases 
in which low pay is destroying basic service capacity and pushing out citizen professionals 
where posts become vacant or are filled by 10 to 20 times as expensive technical assistance 
personnel;
17. Schemes to top up individuals directly (often ill disguised attempts to buy their 
commitment to the payer’s preferred programmes at the expense o f the rest o f their duties) 
or limited to the top 2% (or graduates only) - who then have middle level gaps and base 
level cadre o f low morale with whom to work - are not a viable way forward;
18. What is needed are donor/government agreements on appropriate public sector pay 
scales and then on an appropriate overall budget with concessional transfers useable - 
within these parameters - for pay, complementary services and supplies, capital 
projects, technical assistance and support o f complementary domestic social sector 
programmes with allocation among them basically a recipient decision;
19. Understanding o f the cancerous nature of sub-subsistence (and at higher levels nil 
incentive) pay has been hindered by the nature o f most civil service reform 
programmes:
a. they began as desperate scorched earth, downsizing, cost cutting exercises which - 
except where substantial numbers o f ghost workers could be exorcised - yielded very 
low fiscal gains at high scarce personnel and political costs;
b. subsequent explanations turned to more sophisticated restructuring but largely in a 
organisation and methods context;
c. more basic consideration o f what services to whom the state should provide over what 
time period and what the personnel numbers, qualification and pay implications were 
often came up to five years after the programme’s start (and usually on domestic 
initiatives initially opposed by - e.g. - the World Bank);
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d. so that the two most far reaching studies - Ghana and Tanzania - are only now nearing 
completion and submission for political decision and implementation in the 14th and 
11th years o f their respective structural adjustment programmes;
20. The logical lead and coordinating agency for public service pay level analysis, target 
setting and resource mobilisation (and associated government/domestic social sector 
goal and - therefore - personnel target analysis and advice) would be UNDP. In general 
(exceptions exist) it has not do date played it concentrating on other aspects o f public 
institutions and public services which - however important - cannot succeed unless and 
until the nexus o f don’t pay/don’t get so broken;
21. Nothing in the above argues that more pay alone is sufficient. It is only necessary but 
that alone is ample reason to give it more attention - and external resources.
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NOTES TOWARD MAPPING A WAY FORWARD
The hypotheses set out have moved from being met with incredulity in 1990 through 
sceptical interest to about 1995 to a growing acceptance in principle (shadowed by doubts 
as to practicability o f implementation by weak governments or medium term sustainability 
from domestic resources) at presence. It is now appropriate to move to devising and 
beginning implementation of country programmes - indeed several SSA countries have 
done so albeit with very limited international cooperation and therefore severe problems o f 
achieving sustainable short term progress.
Details will vary significantly from country to country but a number o f guide markers can be 
set out:
1. Raising pay initially (for the worst cases) to two thirds household absolute poverty line 
minimum for professionals, para professionals and skilled personnel with a range up to 
about 10 times that for the top 1% - 2% of public servants i.e. $40 - $100 maximum;
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2. Reducing the range of allowances to those which really do reimburse expenses with the 
notable exception o f housing provision at 10% to 15% of pay where this is long standing, 
fairly widely available and, when initiated, was near an economic rent;
3. In parallel restoring professionalism in procedures and structures and productivity 
(attendance at and to work and simple output proxies related to sector and context). 
Where this cannot be done for all sectors at once phasing in the pay - 
professionalism - productivity package sector by sector over 2 to 4 year may be 
appropriate,
4. Exploring user/community supplements in goods and services e.g. decent, affordable 
housing in rural areas as well as provision o f food and assistance with public servant 
household members agricultural and house maintenance workers part o f  a package o f 
user/community contributions in cash, labour or goods toward unit budgets,
5. Seek to build up coordinated provision of complementary basic services by domestic 
social sector bodies (mosques, churches, women’s organisations, cooperatives, trade 
unions and community/neighbourhood associations) on the basis o f  cost sharing (personnel 
training, suppliers and pay being the main central government contributions);
6. Costing the changes. In some cases they will entail 100% wage and salary bill and 20% 
to 30% o f total recurrent spending increases to reach the efficiency minimum at present 
service provision levels with say 2.5% a year growth to parallel population; 3% a year 
to push basic service provision toward universal access and 2% to continue real pay 
increases to a floor equal to the household absolute poverty line ceiling 8 to 10 times as 
high. In addition supplies (e.g. drugs, texts, chalk, water spares), mobility (whether 
bicycles or vehicles plus spares and fuel), training (initial, upgrading and refresher), repairs 
and maintenance are likely to require a 10% initial increase in recurrent spending;
7. Reallocating external finance - e.g. reducing technical assistance personnel spending by 
at least 25% (the ta. replacements for professionals driven out by low pay), reallocating 
basic service provision (including emergency relief distribution) finance to foreign NGOs 
to  government, local government or domestic social sector institutions as rapidly as 
possible and freeing general or sectoral balance o f payments and budget support finance
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for use in paying efficiency level wages and salaries (as well as for other priority uses) and 
- in some sectors such as education and health - reallocating some o f present capital 
budget assistance to recurrent;
8. To make such shifts increase - rather than erode - accountability and additionality,
concessional finance providers and government would need to agree new public service 
pay structures and overall recurrent budget allocations and expenditures. Literal follow-up 
o f  individual recurrent financial provisions to particular bills is neither practicable nor 
relevant to  efficiency and accountability so long as principles and allocations (ex post as 
well as ex ante) are agreed and ‘leakages’ are squeezed down;
9. Domestic revenue initially needs to be raised primarily from reducing the 20%  to 33%  
of existing taxes which go uncollected and whose recovery could enhance domestic 
recurrent revenue by 25% to 50% (more in nearly collapsed states). That implies pay - 
performance - professionalism - training packages for tax officers (including base level 
inspectors and tax constables). This may require a special tax service - not because o f 
somewhat doubtful gains from tax collection autonomy from Treasuries but to ensure early 
revenue base restoration by paying for harvest, energetic, informed collection. In the 
longer run fiscal growth must be made adequate to reduce external recurrent budget 
dependence in general as well as for public service pay. Most SSA countries need to 
reach 5% to 6% trend output growth to avoid economic and social implosion and 
political erosion or explosion. Even most present SSA tax systems are mildly output 
growth buoyant so that such output growth would lead to 7%  to 9%  real domestic 
recurrent revenue growth. If divided 2.5% to maintain per capita levels, 3% to expand 
access, 2.5% to 3% to reduce external dependence such a growth-rate does offer a bridge 
toward sustainability;
10. UNDP can and should play a catalytic role at country level (with governments and 
external resource providers) in discourse, analysis, participating in costing and mobilisation 
programmes.
A growing number o f SSA government initiatives exist. In the Horn, Ethiopia, Eritrea and
Somaliland - on their own analysis and out o f their own funds - have set out to restore or
recreate professionalism and productivity with $50 - 5000 monthly service pay scales as
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central component. Here initial peace dividends are largely exhausted and short term 
sustainability may well depend on enhanced external allocations to this priority. In Tanzania 
the resource constraints on the 1995 - 6 real doubling o f lower and middle level public service 
pay (to about $50 a month at the base) are even more resource constrained with the possibility 
that augmenting complementary training, complementary materials and mobility support may 
now be as crucial as resources directly allocated to pay. Uganda has altered its programme 
from one concentrated on the graduate level enhancements, sometimes cutting allowances 
(primarily housing) by more than salary increases and depending too heavily on direct use to 
public servant payments, to a much broader approach but still seems over-dependent on non­
government payments to basic service personnel. These initiatives demonstrate three things:
1. Some - perhaps many - SSA governments do back pay - productivity - 
professionalism packages and give them enough priority to reallocate domestic 
resources to them;
2. Relatively speedy first stage programme design is feasible and can be implemented;
3. Sustainability o f present initiatives and pushing them forward appears to be dependent 
(in at least four o f  the five cases - Uganda may be a partial exception) on enhanced 
external support, especially over the next five years to allow domestic revenue growth 
from better enabling governance (basically output expansion and effective tax collection) 
to reduce the degree o f external budgetary dependence.
- Reginald Herbold Green 
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